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The Question of Land Grab in Africa and the
Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Traditional
Lands, Territories and Resources
STEFAAN SMIS, DOROTHÉE CAMBOU & GENNY NGENDE

1

On 13 September 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the UN
2
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). This event
was not only a landmark for the indigenous peoples’ movement but also
constituted an important contribution to the universal human rights
system. The declaration has indeed, after two decades of difficult
negotiations, finally acknowledged that indigenous peoples are, as a
group, holders of human rights.3
The adoption of the UNDRIP has confirmed that indigenous
peoples’ rights are crystallizing into rules of international law at the
universal level. These developments have also been reflected regionally
in the inter-American and, to a lesser extent, the African human rights
system even though none of these regional human rights systems have
adopted a binding legal instrument specifically addressing indigenous
peoples’ rights.4 Nevertheless, through an “evolutive” interpretation of
regional human rights instruments, the Inter-American Court of Human
 The contribution is based on a paper presented at the conference on “Africa and International
Law. Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” Albany NY, 12–14 April 2012.
1. Stefaan Smis is professor of international dispute settlement, international human rights
law and methodology of law at the Faculty of Law and Criminology of the Vrije Universiteit
Brussels (Belgium) and reader in international criminal law at the School of Law of the
University of Westminster (UK). He has widely published on African issues. Dorothée Cambou
and Genny Ngende are PhD researchers at the Faculty of Law and Criminology of the Vrije
Universiteit Brussels.
2. UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/61/L.67 and Add. 1 (Sept. 13, 2007).
3. See id.; Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM.
RTS.
(last
visited
Mar.
3,
2013),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx (showing two decades of
difficult negotiations).
LAB.
ORG.,
4. See
Areas
of
Work,
INT’L
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Aboutus/HistoryofILOswork/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr.
13, 2013); See Working Group to Prepare the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE
ORGANIZATION
OF
AMERICAN
STATES
http://www.oas.org/consejo/cajp/Indigenous%20documents.asp#Record (last visited Mar. 3.
2013) [hereinafter Working Group].
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Rights, and recently the African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights, are developing an interesting body of “case law” that is
contributing to a firmer understanding of indigenous peoples’ rights.5
The growing recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights must be
confronted with the daily practice where we witness that Africa’s land is
again the object of foreign greed. Massive portions of land are currently
being purchased by foreign investors far below market prices and often
without the consent of those who live from the land, with the aim to turn
these lands into lucrative projects where the state will have lost almost
all rights.6 The phenomenon that has been termed “land grab” has
recently started to attract attention worldwide due to its intensification
7
as a result of the global financial, food and energy crises. Africa is,
8
however, most affected by it.
In the current context of Africa where controversy still exists as to
who can be considered an indigenous people and where great areas of
land are becoming the object of “land grabbing” projects, a better
understanding and protection of the indigenous peoples’ right to their
land and resources is becoming a crucial issue for the survival of many
of these population groups. This issue has not received sufficient
attention in legal doctrine.
This contribution starts with a brief description of the causes
leading to the phenomenon of land grab in Africa, followed by an
overview of the instruments that have been adopted at the international
level to protect indigenous peoples’ rights. The UNDRIP will be
presented as constituting the minimum standards for the survival,
9
dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world, and
having the ambition to be a comprehensive instrument reflecting the
current stand of indigenous rights in international law. The paper then
continues with a description of some controversial issues in the
UNDRIP relevant for the topic under research. Subsequently, this paper
analyzes the recent practice at the African regional level, and then ends
with some concluding remarks regarding the compatibility of land grab
practices with standards on indigenous rights.

5. See, e.g., Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) & Minority Rights Grp. Int'l on behalf
of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 276/2003, Afr. Comm'n, ¶¶ 151, 162.
6. Soja Vermeulen & Lorenzo Cotula, Over the Heads of Local People: Consultation,
Consent and Recompense in Large-scale Land Deals for Biofuels Projects in Africa, 37 J.
PEASANT
STUD.
899
(2010),
available
at
http://ccafs.cgiar.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Vermeulen__Cotula_2010.pdf.
7. Phoebe Stephens, The Global Land Grab: An Analysis of Extant Governance
Institutions, 20 INT’L AFF. REV. 3 (2011).
8. Klaus Deininger, Challenges Posed by the New Wave of Farmland Investment, 38 (2) J.
PEASANT STUD. 217, 218 (2011).
9. G.A. Res 61/295, supra note 2, art. 43.
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II. THE ISSUE OF LAND GRAB IN AFRICA
Today, in a context of financial uncertainty, which in turn has
exposed the gravity of related deficiencies such as food insecurity,
many governments are realizing how vital primary resources such as
land can be.10 Conversely, multinational companies in rich and
emerging markets have recently targeted specific countries in Africa to
11
secure land deals to respond to the food security problems, energy
crisis and the corresponding need to turn to biofuel production.12 Also,
the high return that agricultural investment projects seem to generate is
13
an additional reason for the new interest in Africa’s land.
The financial crisis ushered in a new prospective in investment
opportunities in the form of agricultural land because the economic
collapse left investors searching for new ways to “channel their
funds.”14 The surge in land grab is premised on an insatiable need for
arable land, which in turn has been motivated by the need for food
15
security. It is asserted that a nexus exists between the influx of
speculative investments by hedge funds, pension funds and banks and
16
the increase in staple crop prices. The richness and fertility of African
soil, coupled with the financial turnover and economic viability in
investing in the continent has led to a race to acquire African land.17
Another driving force is the “climate of corporate driven globalization,
neo-liberal policy regimes and natural exploitation,” which has also
paved the way for the acquisition of land that is occurring at an
18
exponential rate. This makes Africa fertile ground to exploit and to
further this neo-liberal agenda, as cheap and “unused” and/or
“unproductive” land has become attractive in lieu of the recent
economic climate.19
The cultivation of energy crops abroad is another reason for the
purchasing of African land.20 As volatility in food commodity prices
10. Stephens, supra note 7, at 3, 5.
11. Cecilie Friis & Anette Reenberg, Land Grab in Africa: Emerging Land System Drivers
in a Teleconnected World, GLOBAL LAND PROJECT REP. NO. 1. GLP-IPO, at 4–5 (2010);
Saturnino M. Borras Jr. & Jennifer Franco, From Threat to Opportunity? Problems With the Idea
of a ‘Code of Conduct’ for Land-Grabbing, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 508 (2010).
12. Id.
13. Harry Stephan, Ryan Lobban & Jessica Benjamin, Land Acquisitions in Africa: A Return
to Franz Fanon, 2(1) INT’L J. FOR HISTORICAL STUD. 78 (2010); GRAIN, Pension Funds: Key
Players in the Global Farmland Grab (June 2011), at 2.
14. Stephens, supra note 7, at 4.
15. Stephan, supra note 13, at 78.
16. Stephens, supra note 7, at 6.
17. Stephan, supra note 13, at 77.
18. Land and Research Action Network, Introduction: Global Land Grabs: Investments,
Risks and Dangerous Legacies, 54 DEVELOPMENT 5 (2011).
19. Stephens, supra note 7, at 4.
20. Id. at 5.
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became apparent, it translated into volatility in oil prices; hence the
21
need to replace fossil fuels with biofuels. This is considered to be a
win-win situation for all parties involved, as biodiversity will enable a
foreign state or corporation to meet its ever-increasing demand for
energy.22 Conversely, the African state is said to benefit from the
income derived from these deals, which will supposedly increase
23
employment and lead to other opportunities.
According to the Global Land Project, in 2010, between 51 and 63
million hectares of land were either part of finalized land deals or under
24
negotiation in 27 African States. Deininger, a senior economist at the
World Bank, asserts that the 2009 demand for land in the continent was
equivalent to the total land development in the region over the previous
25
20 years. Prices in Africa for land purchasing or leasing are considered
to be at a very low rate; thus the demand is satisfied by an abundant
supply.26 The inference drawn here is that sale or lease transactions are
more prevalent in the region than in others. Some authors have referred
27
to this as the “new scramble for Africa.” In light of this, one may
speak of the “africanization of land grab.”
One of the most controversial land deals was that of the DaewooMadagascar lease agreement, which permitted a South Korean
corporation to lease 3.2 million acres of land for a period of ninety-nine
29
years.28 This amount consisted of half of Madagascar’s arable land.
This was also a prime example of a government authorizing deals
without consultation or due regard to all relevant stakeholders.30 Subject
21. Id. at 6.
22. Saturnino M. Borras Jr. & Jennifer Franco, From Threat to Opportunity? Problems with
the Idea of a ‘Code of Conduct’ for Land-Grabbing, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 508, 510
(2010).
23. Id.
24. Friis & Reenberg, supra note 11, at 11.
25. Klaus Deininger, Challenges Posed by the New Wave of Farmland Investment, 38(2) J.
PEASANT STUD. 218 (2011).
26. Vermeulen, supra note 6, at 23.
27. JEREMIE GILBERT, THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTSBASED APPROACH TO LARGE SCALE AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE SADC REGION, IN SOUTHERN
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY LAND ISSUES. TOWARDS A NEW SUSTAINABLE LAND
RELATIONS POLICY 144–68 (Ben Chigara ed., 2012); Vermeulen, supra note 6; Richard Ingwe,
James Okoro & Joseph K. Ukwayi, The New Scramble for Africa: How large-Scale Acquisition of
Subsaharan Africa’s Land by Multinational Corporations and Rich Countries Threatens
Sustainable Development, 12(3) J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. AFR. (2010), available at http://www.jsdafrica.com/Jsda/V12No3_Summer2010_A/PDF/The%20New%20Scramble%20for%20Africa,%
20How%20Large-Scale%20Acquisition%20of%20SubSaharan%20Africa’s%20Land%20(Ingwe,%20Okoro,%20Ukwayi).pdf.
28. Stephans, supra note 7, at 82.
29. Sheila Oviedo, Avoiding the Land Grab. Responsible Farmland Investing in Developing
(July
2011),
Nations,
SUSTAINALYTICS,
http://www.sustainalytics.com/sites/default/files/avoiding-the-land-grab-responsible-farmlandinvesting-in-developingnations_final.pdf.
30. Id.
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to the national backlash and the coup d’état that subsequently ensued,
31
the deal was eventually terminated. Similar experiences confront local
populations elsewhere in Africa. In Sierra Leone, 12,500 hectares of
land are being rented by a French company, and in 2010 a Swiss
company acquired another 10,000 hectares.32 In Guinea, 100,000
hectares of land were purchased by an American company.33 A
Singapore-based company purchased 300,000 hectares of land in
Gabon, and a Belgian firm acquired 20,000 hectares for oil and 100,000
34
hectares of concession for livestock.
These widespread land purchases have been accompanied by
claims of entire villages being expropriated of their land. Often it is
indigenous peoples who are being deprived of their land.35 Communal
land rights are being undermined by private ownership.36 This is clearly
highlighted by Shalmali Guttal, who claims that “[w]here [commons
(water, land)] have not been individually appropriated, they are termed
37
‘state property’ by default.”
Investors sign contracts with
governments, which in turn, claim the land as state-owned.38 A 2010
World Bank report on the rising global interest in farmland shows that
land grabbing has often taken place in regions where governments are
39
corrupt or indebted. Many of the investments did not result in
developmental growth for (African) states, and the local population was
left far worse than they were before the sale.40 The report also makes
reference to “yield gaps,” which refers to the exploitation of high arable
41
land-to-yield ratios that benefit wealthy corporations and countries.
Since these deals often do not take the interest of indigenous
populations into account and consent has not been received, this article
will analyze which rights to land and resources indigenous people have
under international and regional law to be able to draw conclusions as to
the compatibility of these land acquisition projects with the emerging
standards on indigenous peoples’ rights.
31. Id. at 2.
32. GRAIN, Land Grabbing and the Global Food Crisis (Nov. 2011), available at
http://www.viacampesina.org/downloads/pdf/en/landgrabGRAIN-dec2011.pdf, at 22.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: The Pragmatic
Revolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.
QUART. 250 (2011).
36. See Land Research Action Network, Introduction: Global Land Grabs: Investments,
Risks and Dangerous Legacies, 54 DEVELOPMENT 5, 7 (2011).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Saturnino M. Borras Jr. et al., Towards a Better Understanding of Global Land
Grabbing: An Editorial Introduction, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 210 (2011).
40. Land Research Action Network, supra note 36, at 2.
41. Id.
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III. INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THEIR RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Overview of Instruments and Initiatives at the Universal Level
The cause of indigenous people has come under the limelight of
the international community over the course of the last decades of the
42
20th century. Before, it was an issue that only sporadically attracted
some attention within the community of states, mainly in the context of
the fight against discrimination and the endeavor to assimilate “tribal”
and “subordinated” communities to the modernized majority.43 During
colonial times, some punctual initiatives by the International Labour
44
Organization (ILO) had been taken, but the first instrument to really
address the question in a more comprehensive manner was the 1957
ILO Convention No. 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in
45
Independent Countries (Convention No. 107), supported by a
Recommendation linked to that convention, namely the Indigenous and
Tribal Populations Recommendation (Recommendation No. 104).46
Ratified by twenty-seven states, a majority of which are countries of
Latin America, the Convention had the objective to address, as a
binding legal instrument, the marginalization and discrimination of
indigenous and tribal populations by recognizing a number of rights and
freedoms.47 Examples are the prohibition from compulsory service, the
right not to be discriminated against, and the right to life, education,
social security, health, and participation.48 More relevant for this
contribution and even though it had afterwards been considered as
42. Julian Burger & Paul Hunt, Towards the International Protection of Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights, 12 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 406 (1994). (The famous lectures of Professor
Fransisco de Vitoria (1480-1546) of the University of Salamanca and the works of the other
famous sixteenth century Spanish scholar Bartolome de las Casas prove that this is not totally
true). But see, e.g., Greg Marks, Indigenous Peoples in International Law: The Significance of
Fransisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas, 13 AUST’L Y.B. INT’L L. 1–52 (1992).
43. Julian Burger & Paul Hunt, Towards the International Protection of Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights, 12 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 406 (1994).
44. The International Labour Organization showed interest in the situation of indigenous
peoples already in the early 1920s. It then undertook a number of studies and in 1926 established
the Committee of Experts on Native Labour to agree on standards for the protection of indigenous
workers.
45. Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (entered
into force June 2, 1959) [hereinafter ILO Convention 107].
The convention is no longer open for ratification but remains in force for seventeen states from
which five are African: Angola, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, and Tunisia.
46. Id.
47. Id.; Athanasios Yupsanis, ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries 1989-2009: an Overview, 3 NORDIC J. INT'L LAW 79, 433–56
(2010).
48. ILO Convention 107, supra note 45, art. 3.
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insufficient, the Convention recognized a right to individual and
collective ownership of land traditionally occupied (Art. 11 Convention
No. 107).49 The Convention also protected indigenous and tribal
populations against removal from their lands without their free consent
(Art. 12 Convention No. 107).50 However, for reasons of national
security, national economic development, or indigenous health, broad
exceptions were provided, allowing state parties to significantly curtail
the right to land.51 In case of displacement, compensation for lost land
was to be granted of a “quality at least equal to those of the lands
previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs
and future development.”52 Convention No. 107 placed the question of
53
indigenous and tribal populations on the international agenda.
Convention No. 107 was, however, often criticized for its
“assimilationist” and paternalistic approach as the underlying
assumption was that traditional customs and culture were an
impediment to social and economic development of the communities
concerned as well as the states in which they were living.54
Succumbing to the growing criticism, in 1986, an ILO meeting of
experts concluded that the language of Convention No. 107 was
“outdated” and “destructive in the modern world” and unanimously
55
recommended to revise the Convention. As a result, steps were taken
to draft a more up-to-date legal instrument, and in 1989, the
International Labour Conference adopted Convention 169 Concerning
56
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which

49. Id.
50. Id. art. 12.
51. ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS:
SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 63 (2007).
52. ILO Convention 107, supra note 45, art. 12(2).
53. Id. at preamble. The preamble and several provisions of the ILO Convention 107
confirm this statement. The indigenous and tribal populations are referred to as “less advanced”
and governments are requested to integrate them progressively into the life of their state society
hoping that they would disappear as separate groups once they have integrated into the national
society. See Lee Swepston, A New Step in the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 682 (1990). See generally
S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).
54. ILO Convention 107, supra note 45, Preamble.
55. Rep. of the Meeting of the Experts, ¶ 46, reprinted in Partial Revision of Indigenous and
Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107), Report VI(1), International Labour Conference,
75th Sess., at 100–18, (Geneva 1988); see Russel Lawrence Barsh, Revision of ILO Convention
No. 107, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 756 (1987).
56. Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Sept.
5, 1990, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989). hereinafter ILO Convention 169; See Athanasios Yupsanis, ILO
Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 19892009: an Overview, 3 NORDIC J. INT'L LAW 79, 433–56 (2010); Swepston, supra note 53;
ANAYA, supra note 53, at 47–49; INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, INDIGENOUS &
TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION NO. 169 (2009).
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revised and improved the previous convention.57 The Convention has
58
since been ratified by some twenty-two states. Reacting against the
assimilationist tendency of Convention No. 107, Convention No. 169
now recognized a right of indigenous and tribal peoples to live and
59
develop as distinct communities. The Preamble confirms this shift of
paradigm by stating “the developments which have taken place in
international law since 1957, as well as developments in the situation of
indigenous and tribal peoples in all regions of the world have made it
appropriate to adopt new international standards on the subject with a
view to removing the assimilationist orientation of earlier standards.”60
A more elaborate and better adapted catalogue of rights is proposed in
the Convention—from non-discrimination to specific economic, social
and cultural rights as well as rights on participation, co-management
and self-governance.61 Also, the provisions on land rights, which were
62
highly criticized, were rephrased to better protect indigenous peoples
inter alia via procedural mechanisms.63 Compared to its predecessor,
64
Convention No. 169 has been considered a major improvement. Other
ILO conventions that are relevant to the protection of the rights of
indigenous peoples but are not specifically addressed to them are the
Conventions on Equality of Opportunity and Treatment in Employment
65
and Occupation and the Conventions Against Forced Labour. Despite
the fact that only one African state recently ratified Convention 169,
ILO has initiated various projects aimed at assisting indigenous and
tribal peoples in Africa as well as their governments.66 Countries such
as Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Morocco,
Tanzania, and South Africa were among the beneficiaries of such
67
support. The ILO also supported the African Commission on Human
57. ANAYA, supra note 53, at 47.
58. See NORMLEX, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169. Among
the twenty-two state parties to the Convention there is only one African state that has recently
ratified the Convention—the Central African Republic.
59. See Sharon Venne, The New Language of Assimilation: A Brief Analysis of ILO
Convention no. 169, 2 WITHOUT PREJUDICE 53 (1990).
60. ILO Convention 169, supra note 56, at 1384.
61. See id.
62. XANTHAKI, supra note 51, at 80. She asserts that the outdated land rights provisions of
Convention 107 were one of the main reasons why the Convention had to be revised.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 90.
65. See Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation,
June 4, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960) [hereinafter ILO Convention
111]; Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, 39 L.N.T.S. 55
(entered into force May 1, 1932) [hereinafter ILO Convention 29]; Convention Concerning the
Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959)
[hereinafter ILO Convention 105].
66. Areas of Work, supra note 4.
67. FELIX MUKWIZA NDAHINDA, INDIGENOUSNESS IN AFRICA: A CONTESTED LEGAL
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and Peoples’ Rights, particularly in the context of research devoted to
the analysis of constitutions, legislation and administrative acts in
68
Africa with a view to better grasp the needs for indigenous protection.
Around the same time, the General Assembly of the Organization
of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution requesting the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights to draft a juridical instrument
69
on indigenous populations in the Americas. This drafting of an
“American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Populations” took
significant delay and is still under consideration by a working group of
70
the Permanent Council. This, however, as shown below, did not
prevent the Inter-American Court on Human Rights from interpreting
the American Convention on Human Rights or the ILO Convention 169
in such a way that allowed the protection of indigenous rights to come
within the ambit of the Court’s competence.71 The organization even
took the lead when it came to indigenous peoples’ protection.72 An
73
interesting body of case law on indigenous peoples’ rights also served
as inspiration for the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights in its first “indigenous peoples” case: the Endorois case.
It all started in the UN in 1971 when the UN Sub-Commission on
FRAMEWORK FOR EMPOWERMENT OF ‘MARGINALIZED’ COMMUNITIES 143–44 (2011); see also
the references to the projects on the ILO, website at www.ilo.org.
68. See, e.g., International Labour Organization, Centre for Human Rights (University of
Pretoria) and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Research findings workshop
Report examining constitutional, legislative and administrative provisions concerning indigenous
and
tribal
peoples
in
Africa
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Resources/Eventdocumentation/Workshopseminarreports/WCMS_
118117/lang--en/index.htm.
69. OAS, General Assembly, 19th Regular Sess., Reports of the Inter-American Commission
on
Human
Rights,
G.A.
Res.
1022,
OAS
Doc.
OEA/Ser.P/AG/
RES/1022 (XIX-0/89) 1989, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/AG-RES_1022_XIX-O89_eng.pdf (intending inter alia to use the opportunity provided by the 500th anniversary of the
“meeting” of the two worlds in 1992 to adopt a juridical instrument relevant to human rights
protection of indigenous peoples). See Maria Magdalena Gomez Rivera, El Derecho Indígena
Frente al Espejo de America Latina, 26 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS 54-58 (1998); see also Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Los Derechos Indígenas en el Sistema
International: Un Sujeto en Construcción, 26 REVISTA INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 101–02 (1998).
70. See Working Group, supra note 4 (showing a list of documents illustrating the
cumbersome process of drafting an American declaration on the rights of indigenous
populations).
71. ILO Convention 169, supra note 56.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Feb. 1, 2000); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
(Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (June 17, 2005); Saramaka People v. Suriname,
Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Aug. 12, 2008).

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

502

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:493

the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointed
a special rapporteur to prepare a study on discrimination against
74
indigenous populations. Meanwhile, indigenous peoples lobbied
successfully for the creation of a working group to instigate the
75
development of human rights standards for indigenous peoples. In
76
1982, the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples was created with a
mandate “to review developments pertaining to the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous
populations and to give special attention to the evolution of standards
77
concerning the rights of indigenous populations.” The UN declared
1993 as the year of the Indigenous Peoples and later that year, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution proclaiming an international
decade of the world’s indigenous peoples beginning December 10,
1994, with the aim of “strengthening international cooperation for the
solution of problems faced by indigenous communities in areas such as
78
human rights, the environment, development, education, and health.”
In July 2000, ECOSOC adopted by consensus a resolution by which to
establish a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to “serve as an
advisory body to the Council with a mandate to discuss indigenous
issues within the mandate of the Council relating to economic and social
development, culture, the environment, education, health and human
79
rights.” The Commission on Human Rights has appointed a Special
74. The study was finally completed in 1983 when the last part was submitted. See Study of
the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: Final Report Submitted by the
Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8 (1983) (Mr. Jose R. Martinez Cobo)
[hereinafter Cobo Final Report].
75. Robert T. Coulter, The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: What
is it? What does it mean?, 13 NETHERLANDS QUARTERLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (1995);
Asbjorn Eide, The Indigenous Peoples, The Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the
Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in MAKING THE
DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 32 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009) [hereinafter Adoption of the UN
Dec]; Erica-Irene A Daes, The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations to
the Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in
MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 48 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).
76. The Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Working Group) is composed of five
members of the Sub-Commission who are appointed by its chairperson. Representatives of states
and indigenous peoples are encouraged to attend and participate in the annual meetings held in
Geneva.
77. Econ. and Soc. Council Res. 1982/34 (May 7, 1982).
78. G.A. Res. 48/163, U.N. Doc. A/RES /48/163 (Dec. 21 1993); G.A. Res. 47/75, ¶ 2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/47/75 (Dec 14 1992). Also, on 20 December 2004 the General Assembly adopted
Resolution 59/174 proclaiming a second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People
to commence on 1 January 2005. See G.A. Res. 59/174, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/174 (Dec. 20,
2004).
79. Econ. and Soc. Council Res. 2000/22 (July 28, 2000). In the Permanent Forum, an equal
number of representatives of indigenous peoples and representatives of governments sit in their
personal capacity.
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Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
of indigenous people, which mandate has been renewed by the Human
80
Rights Council. In December 2007, an expert mechanism was set up
to advise the Council on questions relating to the promotion and
81
protection of human rights of indigenous peoples.
To date, the most significant contribution to indigenous rights has
been the drafting of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples. Initiated in 1985, the Working Group was able to finalize the
82
text of the Draft Declaration at its eleventh session, in 1993. The text
then moved its way through the UN human rights standard- setting
83
machinery. First, the text was adopted without vote by the Sub84
Commission (26 August 1994), followed, in 2006, by a positive vote
of the Human Rights Council, which had recently replaced the UN
85
Commission on Human Rights. Subsequently, on 13 September 2007,
the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration by a vote of 143 in
favor, 11 abstentions and 4 against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
86
and the United States of America). All who are concerned with the
situation of indigenous peoples have welcomed the Declaration as a
major step in the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights and view it as
a significant contribution in the broader area of the protection of human
rights.
B. Analysis of the Controversial Questions in the UNDRIP
The Declaration is a lengthy treaty-like document composed of 24
preambular paragraphs, and an operative body totaling 46 substantive
articles.87 The drafting process of the text “reflect[s] an extraordinary
liberal, transparent, and democratic procedure . . . that encouraged broad
88
and unified indigenous input.” Some of the main hurdles in the
80. Human Rights Council Res. 6/12 (Sept. 28, 2007).
81. Human Rights Council Res. 6/36 (Dec. 14, 2007).
82. Chairperson-Rapporteur on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, Rep. of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its 11th Sess., Aug. 23,
1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 at 50–60 (1993).
83. See generally Adoption of the UN Dec, supra note 75, at 108–37.
84. Comm.
on
H.R.,
Rep.
of
the
Sub-Comm’n
on
Prevention
of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, on its 46th Sess., Aug. 1–26, 2004, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994) at 103.
85. H.R. Council, Rep. to the General Assembly on the 1st Session of the Human Rights
Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/1/L.10 (2006) at 52–56.
86. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights
of Indigenous Peoples; ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for All, Says President,
U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007) (Australia, Canada and New Zealand have since
reconsidered their position and have officially endorsed the UN Declaration. US president Obama
has also declared that the US supports the Declaration.).
87. G.A. Res 61/295, supra note 2.
88. Erica-Irène A. Daes, Dilemmas Posed by the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 63 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 206 (1994). See also John B. Henriksen, The UN
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drafting of the UNDRIP were: the defining of indigenous peoples, the
reference to their right to self-determination, and their access to
traditional lands, territories and resources—rights which received a
prominent place in the UNDRIP despite numerous states’ reluctance to
89
including these rights during the drafting process. These controversial
issues, addressed in the UNDRIP, will be briefly analyzed below.
1. Who are indigenous peoples?
International practice has shown that quite some controversy exists
as to the definition of groups, bearer of human rights under international
90
law. It is not different with indigenous peoples. Although some of the
instruments discussed above have attempted to define the right
91
holders, the UNDRIP has decided to “agree to disagree” with the
92
objective of upholding the project of the declaration. At times,
representatives of indigenous peoples and state representatives have had
radically opposing views.93 While many state representatives rejected
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Some Key Issues and Events in the Process, in
MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 32, 74 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).
89. International Law Association, ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (The
Hague 2010) at 20 [hereinafter ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples]; Henriksen,
supra note 88, at 79–81.
90. See, e.g., Douglas Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 168 (1991).
91. ILO Conventions referred to above have defined the right holders. If one takes ILO
Convention 169, a tribal people is a group “whose social, cultural and economic conditions
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated
wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations.” Highly
relevant is whether they “descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the
establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some
or all of their own social, economic and cultural and political institutions.” To these more
objective criteria an important subjective one is added namely “self-identification as indigenous
or tribal” group. See ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries entered into force on 5 September 1990, Text in 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989).
In Operative Directive 4.20 (1991), ¶¶ 4–5, the World Bank also addressed the question of who
can be considered an indigenous people (i.e., “groups with a social and cultural identity distinct
from the dominant society that makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the development
process”). These “[i]ndigenous peoples can be identified in particular geographical areas by the
presence in varying degrees of the following characteristics: (a) a close attachment to ancestral
territories and to the natural resources in these areas; (b) self-identification and identification by
others as members of a distinct cultural group; (c) an indigenous language, often different from
the national language; (d) presence of customary social and political institutions; and (e) primarily
subsistence-oriented production.” See ILO Convention 107, supra note 45.
92. The same approach has been used for minorities in the United Nations Declaration on
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities where the
minorities are not defined. The latter was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1992. See
G.A. Res. 47/135 (18 Dec. 1992); see generally Patrick Thornberry, The UN Declaration:
Background, Analysis and Observations, in THE UN MINORITY RIGHTS DECLARATION 11–71 (A.
Phillips & A. Rosas eds., 1993).
93. Asbjorn Eide, The Indigenous Peoples, The Working Group on Indigenous Populations
and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of indigenous Peoples, in MAKING THE
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the use of the term “people” or favored the narrowing of its meaning
with the goal of preventing all possible appeal to the right of selfdetermination, the indigenous peoples have consistently claimed that
they have the same rights.94 By the end of the drafting process, African
states, joined by some Asian states, generally favored the adoption of a
definition in the Declaration, though they also noted either that they did
not possess indigenous peoples or that all inhabitants could qualify as
95
“indigenous peoples.” The strategy to include a definition of the
beneficiaries in the Declaration in order to limit its application or to
maintain that the question was foreign to Africa was, however,
unsuccessful (see infra).96 From the beginning, the Working Group was
supportive of the indigenous peoples’ demand:
Indigenous groups are unquestionably “peoples” in every
political, social, cultural and ethnological meaning of this term. They
have their own specific languages, laws, values and traditions; their
own long histories as distinct societies and nations; and a unique
economic, religious and spiritual relationship with the territories in
which they have lived. It is neither logical nor scientific to treat them
as the same “peoples” as their neighbors, who obviously have
97
different languages, histories and cultures.

The United Nations should not pretend, for the sake of a convenient
legal fiction, that those differences do not exist. Although it is missing a
definition, the text of the Declaration endorses the idea of equality
between indigenous peoples and other peoples: “indigenous peoples and
individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals” in
98
terms of dignity and rights. The concept of belonging to the group is
individually determined, but must for obvious reasons, also be “in
accordance with the traditions and customs of the community and
99
nations concerned.” In other words, the individual belonging to a
group, to a great extent, becomes a matter of personal choice as opposed
to often-used theories where one’s belonging is pre-determined by
DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 32, 79 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).
94. Id. at 80.
95. African Group, Draft Aide Memoire on the U.N. Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Draft Aide Memoire]. See also Henriksen, supra
note 88, at 79; Albert Barume, Responding to the Concerns of the African States, in MAKING THE
DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 170–72 (Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).
96. Eide, supra note 93, at 80; see Draft Aide Memoire.
97. U.N. Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1, ¶ 7 (July
19, 1993) [hereinafter Prevention of Discrimination].
98. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, art. 2.
99. Id. art. 9.
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100

alleged objective factors or imposed by law. The individual approach
101
and
is further reflected in Articles 8 and 33 of the Declaration
confirmed in the report of Martinez Cobo, the Special Rapporteur on the
study of discrimination against indigenous populations:
On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who
belongs to these indigenous populations through self-identification
as indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognized and accepted
by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the
group).
This preserves for the communities the sovereign right and
power to decide who belongs to them, without external
102
interference.

When a definition of “indigenous peoples” is needed, reference is
usually made to the now authoritative working definition elaborated by
Martinez Cobo.103 For him,
[i]ndigenous communities, peoples and nations are those
which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and precolonial societies that developed on their territories, consider
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present
non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve,
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories,
and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social
institutions and legal systems.
….
On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who
belongs to these indigenous populations through self-identification
as indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognized and accepted
by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the
104
group).

The focus of the definition is the element of “historical continuity
100. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF. LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE
AGES OF INDIVIDUALISM (1999).
101. Art. 8 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [hereinafter UNDRIP]
refers to the “Indigenous peoples and individuals . . . right not to be subjected to forced
assimilation or destruction of their culture” and Art. 33 UNDRIP states that “Indigenous peoples
have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their customs
and traditions.” See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, arts. 8, 33.
102. Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (Vol. V), ¶¶ 381–82 (Mar. 1987) (by Jose R. Martinez
Cobo) [hereinafter Study of the Problem of Discrimination].
103. Id.
104. Study of the Problem of Discrimination, supra note 102, ¶¶ 379–83.
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105

with pre-invasion or pre-colonial societies.” Therefore, the crux of
the question is who originally occupied the land or more bluntly, who
was there first. In a situation of Western migration and overseas
resettlement, a clear distinction can be made between “those who were
there first” and “those who came later.”106 With respect to Africa,
however, it makes less sense to speak of pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies because arguably, all African communities are to be
characterized as both. The question would then turn to proving who is
107
more indigenous/native than the other. Echoing this argument, in
January 2007, the Assembly of the African Union affirmed that the vast
majority of the peoples of Africa are indigenous to the African
108
continent. Viljoen therefore argues that from an African perspective,
there is a “need to refocus the term ‘indigenous’ to refer to
109
‘marginality’, and ‘self-identification,’ rather than ‘priority of time.’”
This is a view also shared by the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. In its Advisory Opinion on the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, it rejected the view of
the African states (which defended the need to have a definition in the
UN Declaration) and pointed out that it was more appropriate to only
define the main characteristics used to identify indigenous populations
and communities in Africa.110 In particular (but not necessarily
excluding other elements) the Commission suggested the following
elements:
a) Self-identification;
b) A special attachment to and use of their traditional land whereby
their ancestral land and territory have a fundamental importance for
their collective physical and cultural survival as peoples;
105. Jose R. Martinez Cobo describes historic continuity as “the continuation of, for an
extended period reaching into the present, one or more of the following factors: (a) Occupation of
ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; (b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of
these lands; (c) Culture in general, or specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a
tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style,
etc.); (d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother tongue, as the habitual means
of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal
language); (e) Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world; (f)
Other relevant factors.” Id.
106. Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Africa: The Pragmatic
Revolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.
QUART. 245, 250 (2011).
107. Id. at 264.
108. Decision on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, AU
Doc., Assembly/AU/Dec.141 (VIII), ¶ 7 (Jan. 30, 2007) [hereinafter AU Doc. Assembly].
109. FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 280–81 (2007).
110. Advisory Opinion on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, ACHPR, 41st Sess., at 30 (May 2007), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/specialmechanisms/indigenous-populations/un_advisory_opinion_idp_eng.pdf [hereinafter ACHPR
Advisory Opinion].

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

508

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:493

c) A state of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion,
or discrimination because these peoples have different cultures,
ways of life or mode of production than the national hegemonic and
111
dominant model.

With one essential exception, this position is comparable to the
viewpoint of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, which
worked with a flexible combination of criteria to determine the
indigenous quality of a population group.112 Five distinct criteria have
been advanced by the Working Group to classify peoples as indigenous
peoples: (1) traditional lands, (2) historical continuity, (3) distinct
cultural characteristics, (4) non-dominance, and finally (5) self113
identification and group consciousness. On historical continuity, the
African Commission has, for reasons explained above, a different view
for the term indigenous populations. “[I]n Africa, the term indigenous
populations does not mean ‘first inhabitants’ in reference to
aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those having
come from elsewhere.”114 This peculiarity distinguishes Africa from the
other continents where native communities have been almost
annihilated by non-native populations.115 With that view, the African
Commission defended a view suggesting that any African can
116
legitimately consider him/herself as an indigent on the Continent. In
the Endorois case (see infra), however, the Commission had the
opportunity to apply its view to a concrete situation for the first time
and decided whether the Endorois community constituted a beneficiary
of collective rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights.117 In identifying criteria for “indigenousness,” it referred to
occupation of territory, voluntary perpetuation of culture, self118
identification and recognition by other communities as indigenous. It
is relevant to note that for the Commission, even if some of the
community members have joined the mainstream, the community does
119
not lose its indigenous nature.
The question of the definition of
indigenous peoples was also raised at the 2006 workshop in Yaoundé,
which was co-organized by the ILO and the Working Group on

111. Id.
112. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Comm’n on H.R. Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1995/3 (1995).
113. Id. ¶¶ 12–18.
114. ACHPR Advisory Opinion, supra note 110, at 31.
115. Id. at 31.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, at 162.
119. Id. at 34–35.

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

2013]

Land Grab in Africa

509

Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa.120 Not surprisingly, the
ILO and Working Group again recommended taking the peculiar
situation of Africa into account, suggesting not to define indigenous
people, but instead proposing a criteria, similar to those used by the
121
African Commission, to identify the indigenous peoples.
Although it has been impossible for states to agree on an
internationally accepted definition of what constitutes an indigenous
community, one can fairly state that the criteria proposed by various
actors involved in the debate are useful and sufficient. All criteria points
to the same direction even though Africa focuses, for obvious reasons,
less on historical continuity and more on marginalization. Whilst voices
have been uttered to consider all Africans as being indigenous in
practice, it is mainly the traditional communities of hunters-gathers and
some pastoral and nomadic societies such as the pygmies in the forest
areas, the San in Southern Africa, the Touareg in North-West Africa and
those who continue to live at the margin of modern society, who are
considered indigenous groups.122
2. The Right to Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples
The controversy on the term “people” in the drafting process of the
Declaration originates in the demand of indigenous peoples to be
123
granted collective rights, particularly the right to self-determination.
Many countries expressed their reservations to recognizing collective
rights in general and self-determination in particular.124 For instance,
during the drafting process, France and Japan rejected the existence of
125
collective rights. The United States proposed an approach close to
what has been developed for minorities, namely individual rights to be
120. International Labour Organization, Report of the Workshop to Determine the Scope and
Methodology
of
the
Research
(Jan.
9,
2006),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Resources/Publications/WCMS_100797/lang--en/index.htm.
121. For the participants of the workshop, indigenous peoples are socially, culturally and
economically distinct; their cultures and ways of life differ considerably from the dominant
society and their cultures are often under threat, in some cases to the extent of extinction; they
have a special attachment to their lands or territories because the survival of their particular way
of life depends on access and rights to their traditional lands and the natural resources thereon;
they suffer discrimination as they are regarded as “less developed” and “less advanced” than
other more dominant sectors of society; the often live in inaccessible regions, often
geographically isolated and are subjected to various forms of marginalization, both politically and
socially; they are subject to domination and exploitation within national political and economic
structures that are commonly designed to reflect the interests and activities of the national
majority; they base themselves on self-identification, whereby the people themselves
acknowledge their distinct cultural identity, way of life, and seek to perpetuate and retain their
identity. Id. § 1.3.
122. Id. § 7.1.
123. ANAYA, supra note 53.
124. XANTHAKI, supra note 51, at 29–30.
125. Id. at 107.
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exercised individually or in community with others. As for the U.K.,
“[w]ith the exception of the right to self-determination, the United
Kingdom did not accept the concept of collective human rights in
127
international law.”
The right to self-determination nevertheless
occupies a cardinal position in the Declaration.128 This again shows how
effective the indigenous movement was in pushing its agenda into the
negotiating room. In no other human rights instrument did the
beneficiaries play such a prominent role in the drafting.
The Declaration asserts that indigenous peoples enjoy all human
rights, including the right to self-determination.129 Apart from the
Preamble, Article 1 of the Declaration also affirms that indigenous
peoples have the right to full and effective enjoyment of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms recognized by the UN and
international law.130 Article 3 insists on the right to self-determination in
language similar to that used in common Article 1 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
131
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
This general
pronouncement has to be read together with Articles 4, 5, 18, 19, 20,
and 34 in order to distill the meaning and content of indigenous selfdetermination:
Article 3: Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4: Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to selfdetermination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways
and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5: Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and
cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if
they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of
the State.
….
126. Id. at 31–32.
127. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration of Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007).
128. Id.
129. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, at 4.
130. Id. at 3.
131. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted as G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
Annex (16 Dec. 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 1 at 173; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S.
171; International Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted as G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), Annex (16 Dec. 1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

2013]

Land Grab in Africa

511

Article 18: Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through
representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own
procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous
decision-making institutions.
Article 19: States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative
measures that may affect them.
Article 20:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their
political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in
the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development,
and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic
activities.
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and
development are entitled to just and fair redress.
….
Article 34: Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop
and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive
customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the
cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance
with international human rights standards.132

Indigenous peoples, being considered as a particular kind of
peoples, enjoy an equal status and the same rights as those conferred to
133
peoples in general. Indigenous self-determination being built on the
pronouncements of peoples’ self-determination “does not constitute a
134
second class exercise or expression of the rights of peoples.” In an
explanatory note to the Draft Declaration, Professor Daes, ChairpersonRapporteur of the Working Group, expounds the meaning ascribed to
indigenous self-determination. She first examined the leading UN
instruments on self-determination to conclude that:
"self-determination" is a continuing dynamic right, in the
sense that it can be reawakened if, at any moment, representative
democracy fails and no alternatives exist for the defence of
fundamental rights and freedoms.
The concept of "self-determination" has accordingly taken on
a new meaning in the post-colonial era. Ordinarily, it is the right of
the citizens of an existing, independent State to share power
democratically. However, a State may sometimes abuse this right of
132. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, at 3–4, 6–7, 9 (original formatting omitted).
133. ANAYA, supra note 53, at 190.
134. Prevention of Discrimination, supra note 97, at 3.
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its citizens so grievously and irreparably that the situation is
tantamount to classic colonialism, and may have the same legal
consequences. The international community and the present writer
discourage secession as a remedy for the abuse of fundamental
rights, but, as recent events around the world demonstrate, secession
cannot be ruled out completely in all cases. The preferred course of
action, in every case except the most extreme ones, is to encourage
the State in question to share power democratically with all groups,
under a constitutional formula that guarantees that the Government
135
is “effectively representative.”

Practice, however, has demonstrated that indigenous peoples have
been marginalized politically and, except in a few cases, they seldom
effectively participate in national decision-making nor have been
engaged in the constitutional process of their state.
With few exceptions, indigenous peoples were never a part of
State-building. They did not have an opportunity to participate in
designing the modern constitutions of the States in which they live,
or to share, in any meaningful way, in national decision-making. In
some countries they have been excluded by law or by force, but in
many countries that they have been separated by language, poverty,
misery, and the prejudices of their non-indigenous neighbours.
Whatever the reason, indigenous peoples in most countries have
never been, and are not now, full partners in the political process and
lack others’ ability to use democratic means to defend their
136
fundamental rights and freedoms.

This observation led to the growing consensus that the indigenous
peoples’ fight for recognition of their right to self-determination is
legitimate and legally acceptable.137 It is a right to participate in
political, economic, social and cultural life of the state promoting “the
negotiation of arrangements to strengthen states and make them truly
138
representative, democratic, liberal and inclusive.” Indigenous peoples
have overwhelmingly expressed their wish to participate in the decision139
making process within the confines of existing state boundaries. The
fear that many states have when it comes to self-determination—that it
would be used as a tool for the dismemberment of existing states—is
exaggerated. Only in exceptional circumstances, when “the right to
share power democratically would have been abused ‘grievously and
140
irreparably,’” would it be legitimate to appeal to secessionist self135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6.
ANAYA, supra note 53, at 185, 188.
Catherine M. Brölmann & Marjoleine Zieck, Some Remarks on the Draft Declaration on
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141

determination. Self-determination, instead of being seen exclusively
as a means to gain sovereignty or an attribute of it, must rather be
considered as an aspect of a human right with all its underpinning
values and connotations. For Anaya this means that:
[f]irst, self-determination is a right that inheres in human
beings themselves, although collectively as “peoples” in the
broadest sense of the term. Second, like all human rights, selfdetermination derives from common conceptions about the essential
nature of human beings, and it accordingly applies universally and
equally to all segments of humanity. Third, as a human right, selfdetermination cannot be viewed in isolation from other human
rights norms but rather must be reconciled with and understood as
part of the broader universe of values and prescriptions that
142
constitute the modern human rights regime.

The Declaration innovates in a way to exercise self
determination.143 Though autonomy or self-government is generally not
144
considered a term of art in existing international law, and though it is
rather a concept confined to domestic constitutional law, it is one of the
pillars upon which the whole Declaration rests. Article 4 of the
Declaration, quoted above, sets the general rule.145 Combined with
other substantive articles (such as Arts. 4, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36), it
gives the indigenous communities the right to govern their most
essential matters autonomously.146 Said differently and compared to
how (internal) self-determination has been interpreted by UN human
147
rights treaty bodies such as the Human Rights Committee and the
148
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 8 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 103, 107 (1995).
141. Id.
142. S. James Anaya, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the PostDeclaration Era, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION
ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 184 (Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds.,
2009).
143. G.A. Res 61/295, supra note 2.
144. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 4 (1992).
145. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, art. 4.
146. Id. arts. 4, 21, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36.
147. Reference is made by the Human Rights Committee to self-determination as “a right
belonging to all peoples to participate in their governance through democratic processes.” See
U.N. H.R. Comm., Rep. of the Human Rights Committee 143, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984).
148. In its General Recommendation XXI the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination stated that “[i]n respect of the self-determination of peoples two aspects
have to be distinguished. The right to self-determination of peoples has an internal aspect, i.e. the
right of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development without
outside interference. In that respect there exists a link with the right of every citizen to take part in
the conduct of public affairs at any level as referred to in Article 5(c) of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In consequence,
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self-determination is more viewed as an instrument for self-rule rather
than a means to achieve participation in the polite of the state. A similar
view is defended by Brölman and Zieck:
Although these [measures can] be interpreted as a means to ensure
the national government is a ‘representative’ one, the participation
envisaged seems predominantly geared to preserving indigenous
autonomy. Indicative in this respect is that the gist of the
participation of indigenous peoples in national affairs is confined to
those instances where, without such participation, interference by
the state in the ‘internal affairs’ of the indigenous community would
149
be possible.

In essence, indigenous self-determination must be considered as a
means to redress past marginalization in order to be able to fully exist
and develop as a distinct group.150 This means that indigenous peoples
must have all possibilities to participate in the decision-making process
of the larger society in which it lives, but more importantly, it is also a
right to an autonomous exercise of competences deemed necessary to
protect the economic, social, and cultural distinctness.
3. The Right to Traditional Lands and Resources
The bulk of UN practice on self-determination has mainly focused
on the political dimension of the right even though the basic human
rights instruments also refer to the right to freely pursue its own
economic development.151 Although “economic self-determination”
constitutes the natural counterpart of the political aspect of selfdetermination, however, it has never received the same attention in the
152
UN and other circles. It is, to quote Oloka-Onyango, “as if selfdetermination has been shorn of all its economic elements and [has]
153
become solely concerned with borders, territory, and nationalism.”
governments are to represent the whole population without distinction as to race, colour, descent,
national, or ethnic origins. The external aspect of self-determination implies that all peoples have
the right to determine freely their political status and their place in the international community
based upon the principle of equal rights and exemplified by the liberation of peoples from
colonialism and by the prohibition to subject peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and
exploitation.” See Office of High Comm'r for H.R., Gen. Rec. No. 21: Right to Selfdetermination, 1, U.N. Doc. CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3 (Aug. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Gen. Rec. No.
21).
149. Brölmann & Zieck, supra note 140, at 106.
150. FELIX MUKWIZA NDAHINDA, INDIGENOUSNESS IN AFRICA: A CONTESTED LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR EMPOWERMENT OF ‘MARGINALIZED’ COMMUNITIES 143–44 (1st ed., 2011).
151. Alice Farmer, Toward a Meaningful Rebirth of Economic Self-Determination: Human
Rights Realization in Resources-Rich Countries, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 417, 457 (2006).
152. See id. at 419.
153. J. Oloka-Onyango, Heretical Reflection on the Right to Self-Determination: Prospects
and Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
156 (1999).
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Despite its codification as a distinct form of self-determination, the
application of economic self-determination has mainly been approached
from a state-centric perspective, considering the state rather than the
people as the right holder.154 The indigenous claims to land and
territories are closely linked to the economic aspect of selfdetermination because without control of their traditional lands and
natural resources, efforts to preserve indigenous distinctness will not
bear fruit.155 The UNDRIP therefore refers to political as well as
economic self-determination.156 Moreover, by devoting a number of
provisions to indigenous peoples’ rights to their traditional lands,
territories and resources, it obliges the analyst to pay more attention to
an aspect that has greatly been neglected in the traditional selfdetermination debate.157
Traditional lands and resources have always been important for the
survival of indigenous peoples.158 It was mentioned above that ILO
Convention 169 was drafted to respond to the criticism uttered against
its predecessor—criticism also related to the insufficient protection of
land rights.159 Recognizing rights for indigenous peoples without
regulating the land question is to a great extent meaningless.160 To quote
Martinez Cobo,
[i]t is essential to know and understand the deeply spiritual
special relationship between indigenous peoples and their land as
basic to their existence as such and to all their beliefs, customs,
traditions and culture . . . . Their land is not a commodity which can
161
be acquired, but a material element to be enjoyed freely.

The UN has consistently, through its human rights bodies,
acknowledged that to be effective, the indigenous peoples’ right to exist
as a distinct cultural community must include rights over their
162
traditional lands and resources. Another avenue that has frequently
154. Farmer, supra note 151, at 448.
155. Id. at 426.
156. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, ¶ 3.
157. International Work Group of Indigenous Affairs, Indigenous Peoples in Africa: The
Forgotten Peoples?, ACHPR (2006), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/specialmechanisms/indigenous-populations/achpr_wgip_report_summary_version_eng.pdf.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Study of the Problem of Discrimination, supra note 102.
161. Id. ¶ 197.
162. See UNESCO, UNESCO and Indigenous Peoples: Partnership to Promote Cultural
Diversity (May 2006), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001356/135656M.pdf
[hereinafter UNESCO Cultural Diversity]. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of
Discrimination Against Indigenous People, UN Docs E/CN.4/Sub.2/476, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21; Working Paper of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, Working Paper of the UN Working Group on Indigenous
Populations by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, on the Concept of “Indigenous People”, UN Doc
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been used by international and regional organizations to recognize land
and resource rights to indigenous peoples is a non-discriminatory
application of property rights, which would result in the state not
163
necessarily “owning” indigenous land and resources. According to
Mattias Ahren, “it is discriminatory to design a domestic legal system in
such a way that stationary land use common to the non-indigenous
population results in rights to [land, territory, and resource right]
whereas more fluctuating use of land, common in many indigenous
164
cultures, does not.” The legal system must not only be formally
nondiscriminatory, “it must also guarantee equal treatment in
substance.”165
The controversy regarding indigenous peoples’ rights to their land
and natural resources remains, however, heavily contested; and the
UNDRIP fails to fully clarify the position of international law in this
166
regard. The negotiations of the land and resources provision of the
167
Declaration were extremely difficult and delayed the adoption of the
Declaration until the end. The dependence on lands and resources for
indigenous peoples’ survival is recognized in the preamble of the
Declaration (in recital 6) and various provisions specify the content of
168
indigenous peoples’ land and resource rights. The most important
provisions are the following:
Article 25:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or
otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal
seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to
future generations in this regard.
Article 26:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by
reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or
/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes).
163. See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
204 (ser. E) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007).
164. Mattias Ahren, The Provisions on Lands, Territories and Natural Resources in the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Introduction, in MAKING THE
DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009).
165. Id.
166. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 21.
167. Ahren, supra note 164, at 205–09.
168. Similar but less far-reaching and less detailed provisions are found in Articles 13, 14 and
15 of ILO Convention 169.
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use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands,
territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with
due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the
indigenous peoples concerned.
....
Article 28:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can
include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and
equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used,
and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged
without their free, prior and informed consent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned,
compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources
equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation
or other appropriate redress.169

The first provision recognizes the special (spiritual) relationship
between indigenous peoples and their traditional lands.170 One could
argue that this is more a general statement without far-reaching legal
consequences. The two latter provisions are much more significant in
terms of law and corresponding state obligations.171 They stipulate that
indigenous peoples have a right of ownership over these lands and
resources, and that they consequently have a right to control and decide
how to use and develop them.172 Ownership should not be construed in
its traditional Western view of property rights but more in the sense of
custody and usufructs of something belonging collectively to past,
present and future generations. According to the International Law
Association, land rights are not aimed at safeguarding “property rights,”
i.e., an exclusive absolute right to use, enjoy and dispose of a thing (uti,
frui, fui)—which according to the Western world, has an economic
connotation—but rather as a prerogative with a primarily spiritual, i.e.,
cultural, purpose.173 In other words, the right is functional to the
safeguarding—through ensuring the maintenance of the special link
between indigenous peoples and their Motherland—of the very distinct
cultural identity of indigenous peoples as well as of their ability to
174
survive and flourish as different human communities.
What is important is whether the traditional land and resources
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 2, at 7–8 (original formatting omitted).
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89.
Id. at 12.
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have been in “use” by indigenous peoples rather than “owned” by them.
In situations where they have lost their land and resources without
consent, indigenous peoples have a right to redress preferably via
restitution or alternatively via fair and equitable compensation.175
Compared to ILO Convention 169, the Declaration constitutes an
important improvement for indigenous peoples because, besides
restating what was already recognized in that convention, it refers for
the first time to the right over traditional lands and resources they have
176
been deprived of.
This right of restitution, however, could be
construed on the basis of universal and regional human rights
instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
For example, in General Recommendation XXIII on indigenous
peoples, the Committee of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
stipulated that:
5. The Committee especially calls upon States parties to recognize
and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop,
control and use their communal lands, territories and resources and,
where they have been deprived of their lands and territories
traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used without their free
and informed consent, to take steps to return those lands and
territories. Only when this is for factual reasons not possible, the
right to restitution should be substituted by the right to just, fair and
prompt compensation. Such compensation should as far as possible
177
take the form of lands and territories.

Although the consensus around rights to traditional lands and
resources was hard to reach for political and financial reasons, the
Declaration mainly codifies existing rules on the issue.178 This view,
combined with the growing recent state practice, has shown that land
rights, although not fully crystallized, have entered the domain of
179
customary international law.
It is relevant to note that even though the Declaration recognizes
that indigenous peoples possess extended land rights, it remains silent
175. G.A. Res 61/295, supra note 2, ¶ 28.
176. Ahren, supra note 164, at 212.
177. CERD, General Recommendation XXIII, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 55th sess., U.N.
Doc. A/52/18, annex V at 122 (1997), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 213 (2003).
178. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.
(last
visited
Mar.
3,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx.; Ahren, supra note 164, at
213.
179. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 23.
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when it comes to defining the concept of traditional lands.180 As will be
shown below, the regional human rights systems currently involved
with indigenous peoples’ rights have been able to define the concept in
such a way that it becomes very significant for indigenous peoples.
4. The legal value of the UNDRIP
The UNDRIP has been adopted as a resolution of the UN General
Assembly and has therefore, legally speaking, only the status of a
recommendation.181 There is, however, a growing understanding that
the Declaration (if not all provisions, at least some of them) can be
182
considered as declaratory of customary international law
or “‘an
authoritative statement of norms concerning indigenous peoples on the
183
basis of generally applicable human rights principles.’” Not only did
the drafting process mirror that of an international treaty, it was also
adopted by a significant majority of 143, 4 against, and with 11
abstentions.184 States, which voted against the Declaration, have
recently declared a willingness/readiness to endorse the Declaration.185
Practice on indigenous peoples’ rights is growing at the regional and
state levels.186 This has prompted the ILA to conclude that it can now be
187
considered as a reflection of customary international law.
It is
relevant to note that the African Commission, in its first decision on
indigenous peoples’ rights extensively quoted the UN Declaration,
thereby showing that it considered it to possess an opinio juris
188
character.
IV. AFRICAN REGIONAL PRACTICE
A. The emergence of an indigenous friendly interpretation
of the African human rights instruments
The recognition of indigenous peoples as holders of specific
human rights in Africa is of very recent date and is mainly due to
ground work done by international NGOs therein, followed by the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African

180. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 20–21; G.A. Res
61/295, supra note 2, at 10.
181. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 5.
182. S. Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1176 (2008).
183. XANTHAKI, supra note 51, at 120.
184. ILA Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 89, at 4–5.
185. Id. at 5.
186. Id. at 47, 49.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5.
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189

Commission). The origin of Africa’s involvement with indigenous
peoples’ rights can be traced back to an international conference on
indigenous peoples in Africa organized by the International Work
190
Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) in Arusha in 1999.
The
conference was attended by the African Commissioner Pityana who
encouraged “the African Commission . . . to address the human rights
situation of indigenous peoples in Africa, which it had so far never done
191
before.” Initially, however, the African Commission opposed the idea
to consider any issue relating to indigenous peoples; however, already
one year after the conference it decided to put the question of
indigenous peoples on its agenda as a specific item of interest. This
encouraged both the Commission and indigenous peoples’ organizations
192
to pursue the matter further. In 2000, a Working Group on Indigenous
Populations/Communities (Working Group) was set up by the African
Commission with a mandate to “[e]xamine the concept of indigenous
peoples and communities in Africa; Study the implications of the
ACHPR and well being of indigenous communities; Consider
appropriate recommendations for the monitoring and protection of the
rights of indigenous communities; and Submit a report to the African
193
Commission.”
Between 2000 and 2003, the Working Group, in consultation with
human rights experts and representatives of indigenous communities,
drafted a comprehensive report on the situation of indigenous peoples in
Africa, which was adopted by the African Commission in November
194
2003. It confirmed the existence of indigenous populations while also
proposing possible criteria for identifying these population groups in
195
Africa. This had been an actual concern, as African governments
were often reluctant to recognize the existence of indigenous
communities in Africa for fear of exacerbating tensions between ethnic
189. Frans Viljoen, Reflections on the Legal Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in
Africa, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN AFRICA
96 (Solomon Dersso ed., 2010).
190. UN Comm’n on H.R.: Rep., Seminar on Multiculturalism in Africa: Peaceful and
Constructive Group Accommodation in Situations Involving Minorities and Indigenous Peoples,
UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/WP.3 (May 13–15, 2000).
191. Kaeleboga N. Bojosi, Protecting Indigenous Peoples in Africa: An Analysis of the
Approach of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 6 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J.
382, 390 (2006).
192. IWGIA, The Indigenous World Yearbook 2001-2002 (2002), available at
http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/IW_2002.pdf.
193. U.N. Comm’n H.R., ACHPR Res. 51, African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights (Nov. 6, 2000) [hereinafter ACHPR Res. 51].
194. ACHPR, Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous
Populations/Communities (2005) [hereinafter ACHPR Report]; See Resolution on the Adoption
of the ‘Report of the African Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous
Populations/Communities’ (IV), 28th Ordinary Sess. (Nov. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Resolution].
195. See id. Ch. 4.
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groups and also because it was believed that their legal recognition
could threaten the territorial integrity of states.196 A further argument
advanced was that all Africans are indigenous to the continent and
therefore the concept might not be suitable for African situations.197 The
report also specified the human rights of indigenous peoples and
referred to related issues of concern.198 To specify the human rights of
indigenous peoples, reference was made to individual and collective
rights referred to in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
which were analyzed in light of the jurisprudence of the African
Commission.199 Interestingly, the report referred to the fact that people
were not defined in the Charter, and used that fact to defend a very
progressive stance—that the ACHPR peoples’ rights provisions were
equally relevant for “a section of the population” such as minority and
200
indigenous populations.
Describing human rights violations
undergone by indigenous peoples, the report inter alia, emphasized the
201
violations of land and natural resources. In the words of the report,
Dispossession of land and natural resources is a major human
rights problem for indigenous peoples. They have in so many cases
been pushed out of their traditional areas to give way for the
economic interests of other more dominant groups and large-scale
development initiatives that tend to destroy their lives and cultures
rather than improve their situation. The establishment of protected
areas and national parks has impoverished indigenous pastoralist
and hunter-gatherer communities . . . . Large-scale extraction of
natural resources such as logging, mining, dam construction, oil
drilling and pipeline construction have had very negative impacts . .
. . So has the widespread expansion of areas under crop production.
They have all resulted in loss of access to fundamental natural
resources that are critical for the survival of both pastoral and
hunter-gatherer communities such as grazing areas, permanent
202
water sources and forest products.

These examples are considered by the report to be violations of
Articles 20, 21, 22, and 24 of the ACHPR.203 These rights clearly
suggest that the drafters of the report believe that indigenous peoples
possess expansive land and resource rights under the African human
204
rights system.
This is contrary to the traditional state-centric
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 58.
Id. at 68.
Id.
ACHPR Report, supra note 194; see Resolution, supra note 194, at 72–79.
Id. at 57, 76.
Id. at 12–13, 20.
Id. at 20.
The Forgotten Peoples?, supra note 157.
Id.
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approach, which confers ownership rights to land and natural resources
205
to the governments. The report also manifested its concern regarding
customary rights of indigenous peoples and recommended that states
recognize and protect these rights as they are central to indigenous
206
survival.
The mandate of the Working Group has been successively
prolonged, but in 2007, following the African Union decision to defer
the adoption of the UN Declaration in the UN General Assembly, the
Working Group proceeded to draft the Commission’s Advisory Opinion
on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
207
Peoples. In the 2007 Advisory Opinion, the Commission made an
effort to convince the African states of the necessity to protect
indigenous rights by responding to the African states' skepticism with
respect to the draft UN Declaration.208 Because of the strong opposition
of African states, the arguments put forth by the Commission in the
Advisory Opinion proved crucial to change the position of African
209
states in the UN. The Advisory Opinion referred to the Commission’s
previous report on indigenous peoples and argued that indigenous
peoples should be understood differently because “in Africa, the term
indigenous populations does not mean ‘first inhabitants’ in reference to
aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those having
210
come from elsewhere.” As to the content of the rights recognized in
the draft UN Declaration, the African Commission tried to persuade the
205. Group of African States, Draft Aide-Memoire on the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples New York (Nov. 9, 2006).
206. ACHPR Report, supra note 194, at 97.
207. See Draft Aide Memoire, supra note 205 (showing that after the adoption of the draft
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the Human Rights Council in June 2006,
African states therein supported by the African Union started a strategy to defer the adoption of
the UN Declaration. In January 2007 the AU Assembly welcomed the deferral of the adoption of
the draft UN Declaration and mandated the African Group of states at the UN to guard Africa’s
interests and concerns in this debate. The concerns of the AU mainly focused on the definition of
indigenous peoples; the reference to a right to self-determination; ownership of land and
resources; the establishment of political and economic institutions; and the destabilizing effect it
could have on national and territorial integrity); see also Rachel Murray, The UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa: The Approach of the Regional Organisations to
Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES 485–505 (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011).
208. ACHPR Advisory Opinion, supra note 110.
209. See Rachel Murray, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in
Africa:TRhe Approach of the Regional Organisations to Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON
THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 485–505 (Stephen Allen &
Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011) (stating that prior to the Advisory Opinion little consideration
was given to the Commissions’ and the Working Groups’ view on indigenous peoples by the AU
and its member states. For example, when it came to consider the draft UN Declaration at the UN
and later within the AU, African states and the AU main organs made no reference to the work of
the African Commission and Working Group on indigenous peoples); see also ACHPR Advisory
Opinion, supra note 110.
210. ACHPR Advisory Opinion, supra note 110, ¶ 13.
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African states that they largely correspond to human rights standards
already existing at the African continent.211 For example, on the issue of
land rights, the Advisory Opinion emphasized that the Declaration’s
provisions were similar to those found in instruments already adopted
by the AU.212 For example,
the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources whose major objective is: “to harness the natural and
human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our
peoples in spheres of human endeavor” (preamble) and which is
intended “to preserve the traditional rights and property of local
communities and request the prior consent of the communities
213
concerned in respect of . . . their . . . traditional knowledge.”

Similarly, with regard to the right of self-determination, the
Advisory Opinion stated that:
Article 46 of the Declaration . . . is in conformity with the African
Commission’s jurisprudence on the promotion and protection of the
rights of indigenous populations based on respect of sovereignty,
the inviolability of the borders acquired at independence of the
member states and respect for their territorial integrity . . . .
....
[T]he notion of self-determination has evolved with the development
of the international visibility of the claims made by indigenous
populations whose right to self-determination is exercised within the
standards and according to the modalities which are compatible with
214
the territorial integrity of the Nation States to which they belong.

In doing so, the Advisory Opinion has undoubtedly contributed to
countering the reluctance of the African states so that the UNDRIP
215
could be adopted by an overwhelming majority.
The role of the
African Commission in favor of indigenous rights protection has, thus,
been both valuable at the international and regional level.216 On one
hand, it has participated in “reconnecting” the African continent with
217
the developments taking place at the international level; and on the
other hand, it has increased awareness of the human rights violations
suffered by indigenous peoples in Africa, as well as the need to address
them on the basis of both the individual and collective rights provisions
211. Advisory Opinion of the African Comm. on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, African Comm. on Human & Peoples’ Rights,
Rep. on its 41st Sess. (2007).
212. Id.
213. Id. ¶ 35.
214. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22 (emphasis omitted).
215. See also Gilbert, supra note 35, at 247.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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of the ACHPR.218
B. The Implementation of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
to Land and Resources: From Theory to Practice
1. Regional practice
The African Commission played an important role in convincing
African states of the need to address the situation of indigenous
peoples.219 When acting as an implementation organ of the ACHPR, it
complemented this advocacy work by showing its commitment to
giving its work practical meaning. In both state reporting as well as
individual communication procedures, the Commission has increasingly
drawn attention to issues regarding indigenous peoples. Although the
1991 Commission Guidelines for state reporting recommended states to
indicate the measures taken to promote the cultural heritage of “national
220
ethnic groups and minorities and of indigenous sectors” of society, it
is only since 2002, with the establishment of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations/Communities, that the Commission has started
to effectively pose questions on the situation of indigenous peoples in
221
the states under scrutiny.
The same openness to indigenous peoples’ demands can be
perceived in the individual communication mechanism. In a small
number of cases, the African Commission was able to clarify the
222
collective rights recognized in the ACHPR.
At the beginning,
however, the peoples’ rights were interpreted in such a way that it was
not fully clear whether it applied to other collectivities or to the entire

218. Id.
219. ACHPR Res. 51, supra note 193.
220. Afr. Charter, Guidelines for Nat’l Periodic Reps., ¶ III(14)(b)(iv), available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/theme02/african_commission_resolution_
13.pdf.
221. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR) on the Initial Rep. of Kenya, 41st Sess., May 16–30, 2007, available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/kenya/kenya_concluding_observations_20
07.pdf; Concluding Observations of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)
on S. Afr. Periodic Rep., 38th Sess., Nov. 21–Dec. 5, 2005, available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/southafrica/southafrica_concluding_obser
vations_periodic_report_2005.pdf; Supp. Rep. on the Inaugural Rep. of Uganda to the Afr.
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), May 2006, available at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/documents/ahrdd/theme02/uganda_shadow_report_indigeno
us_peoples_2006_a.pdf.
222. Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire (2000) AHRLR 72 (ACHPR 1995); Malawi
African Association and Others v. Mauritania (2000) AHRLR 149 (ACHPR 2000); Legal
Resources Foundation v. Zambia, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm.
No. 211/98 (2001).
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state population.223
In 2001, a decision was handed out by the African Commission
that has been described as an important victory for those defending
minority rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights in
224
Africa. In the Ogoni case, the African Commission found that the
killings and destruction by Nigerian governmental forces and agents of
the state-controlled oil company in Ogoniland had violated the right to
life and dignity, the right to health, the right to property, the rights to
shelter and food, and the right to economic, social and cultural
225
development of the Ogoni.
Although the case was not explicitly
approached as an indigenous peoples’ question, the case seemed
relevant for indigenous peoples for two reasons: first, the
communication has largely inspired the Working Group to describe
indigenous peoples’ rights; and second, it has paved the way for the
development of a more significant implementation of indigenous rights
in Africa. With the Ogoni case the Commission opened a door to a
progressive interpretation of the beneficiaries of peoples’ rights.226
Despite the lack of express recognition of the Ogoni community as an
indigenous people, the Commission’s decision to approach the rights of
the Ogoni people collectively demonstrates that the decision created the
227
implication that the Ogoni were a people.
In addition, the
Commission argued that “the African Charter, in Articles 20 through
24, clearly provides for peoples to retain rights as peoples, that is, as
“collectives” and that “the importance of community and collective
identity in African culture is recognized throughout the African
228
Charter.” Thus, it could be implicitly inferred from the decision that
the provisions on people’s rights were applicable to minorities as well
as to indigenous peoples. The second element of relevance for
indigenous peoples in the Ogoni case is the express acknowledgment by
the Commission that “with regard to a collective group, the resources
belonging to it should be respected, as it has to use the same resources
223. Id.
224. Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Self-Determination v. State Sovereignty: A Critique of the
Afr. Comm’n Decision in the Ogoni Case, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
303 (Josh Castellino and Niamh Walsh eds., 2005).
225. The complaint was lodged by two NGOs in 1996 alleging human rights violations
perpetrated by the Nigerian government against the Ogoni people. The Ogoni inhabit the Niger
Delta where important oil reserves are exploited since the 1950s. Nigeria was accused of being
directly involved in the development of oil activities, which led to massive environmental
degradation, widespread contamination of Ogoniland and resulted in the death of numerous
members of the community. See The Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Center for
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Report
No. 155/96 at 60, 68, 69, 72 (2001) [hereinafter Ogoni Case].
226. Bojosi, supra note 191, at 400–05.
227. Id. at 404.
228. Ogoni Case, supra note 225, ¶ 40.
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to satisfy its needs.”
For the Commission, the right to property
“includes not only the right to have access to one’s property and not to
have one’s property invaded or encroached upon, but also the right to
undisturbed possession, use and control of such property however the
230
owners deem fit.” This statement is of great significance to the land
and resources rights of indigenous peoples as it sets a specific standard
231
that can be applied to all kinds of peoples.
Following the Ogoni case, several communications were brought
to the attention of the African Commission, but none of these cases
232
reached the merits stage until the Endorois case was decided on the
233
merits in 2009. In the landmark Endorois case concerning indigenous
peoples, the African Commission found that the Kenyan government’s
eviction of the Endorois people from their ancestral lands amounted to
several violations of the ACHPR, in particular Articles 8, 14, 17, 21,
234
and 22. Further, the African Commission recommended restitution of
their traditional lands, recognition of their ownership rights, and
235
compensation for harm suffered during the displacement.
In the 1970s the government of Kenya created the Lake
Hannington and the Lake Bogoria Game Reserves on the ancestral
territories of the Endorois community and relocated them to areas
claimed to be unsuitable for their pastoral way of life.236 The Endorois
were only sporadically allowed to visit sites associated with their
spiritual belief, and the promised compensation and share of income
from the game reserves and exploitation of precious gems found on
their lands never materialized.237 The complaint on behalf of the
229. Id. ¶ 45.
230. See e.g., Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania (2000) AHRLR 149
(ACHPR 2000).
231. In the complaint led by the Endorois people to the African Commission (see infra),
multiple references to the Ogoniland case were made by the Endorois indigenous community to
sustain its claims. See George Mukundi Wachira, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Land and
Natural Resources in Africa, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN AFRICA (Solomon Dersso ed., 2010).
232. Bakweri Land Claims Committee v. Cameroon (2004) AHRLR 43 (ACHPR 2004).
233. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 162.
234. These are respectively the provisions on the right to religion, to property, the right to
cultural identity, to land and natural resources and the right to development. See id. ¶ 22.
235. Id. The African Commission recommended that Kenya: (a) Recognise rights of
ownership to the Endorois and Restitute Endorois ancestral land; (b) Ensure that the Endorois
community has unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria and surrounding sites for religious and
cultural rites and for grazing their cattle; (c) Pay adequate compensation to the community for all
the loss suffered; (d) Pay royalties to the Endorois from existing economic activities and ensure
that they benefit from employment possibilities within the Reserve; (e) Grant registration to the
Endorois Welfare Committee; (f) Engage in dialogue with the Complainants for the effective
implementation of these recommendations; and (g) Report on the implementation of these
recommendations within three months from the date of notification. Id. at 8.
236. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 220.
237. Id. ¶¶ 80, 112, 124.
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Endorois alleged that the government of Kenya, in creating those
reserves, forcibly removed the community from their lands without
proper prior consultations or adequate and effective compensation.238
Not only were the Endorois deprived of a share of the income their land
generated, but they were also prohibited from enjoying the resources
produced by their land.239
On many accounts, the decision innovates, but that should not be
surprising taking into account the progressive stance the African
Commission had recently taken in indigenous peoples’ matters.240 It is
beyond the scope of this contribution to analyze each violation and we
will—taking into account the scope of it—limit ourselves to property
241
and natural resources rights.
The Commission agreed with the complainants that the contested
lands were traditional lands of the Endorois community.242 The
Commission referred to the fact that the Endorois had lived in the Lake
Bogoria area from time immemorial, constructed homes on the land,
cultivated the land, enjoyed unchallenged rights to pasture, graze, and
243
forest land, and relied on the land to sustain their livelihood:
apart from a confrontation with the Masai over the Lake Bogoria
region three hundred years ago, the Endorois have been accepted by
all neighbouring tribes, including the British Crown, as bona fide
owners of their land. The Respondent State does not challenge those
244
statements of the Complainants.

The criteria defining traditional lands are the centuries of
uncontested occupation and use prior to the eviction.245 Knowing that
many pastoral but also other traditional societies in Africa claim that
type of relationship with their land, this position of the African
Commission has the potential to turn the accepted view on land
property/ownership upside down. Having acknowledged that customary
rights and effective occupation over ancestral lands constitute property
under the African Charter, the Commission could then give its view on
the nature of property rights taking into account “the informal,
unwritten nature of such rights and the vulnerability this gives rise to in
238. Id. ¶ 2.
239. Id. ¶ 124.
240. See ACHPR Advisory Opinion, supra note 110, at 9.
241. It is, for example, the first time that an international human rights treaty implementation
body gave its view on the right to development.
242. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 184; Rhodri C. Williams, African
Commission 'Endorois Case'-Toward a Global Doctrine of Customary Tenure?, TERRANULLIUS
(Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://terra0nullius.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/the-africancommission-endorois-case-toward-a-global-doctrine-of-customary-tenure/.
243. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 184.
244. Id.
245. Id. ¶ 150.
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cases where they are not given some degree of formal recognition.”
To that end the Commission not only draws on its prior jurisprudence,
but also refers to the case law of the European Court on Human Rights
247
and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.
Even in the absence
of formal title, someone may exercise property rights in the meaning of
undisturbed possession, use, and control. It may also include broader
interests and assets. For the Commission, Kenya “has a duty to
recognise the right to property of members of the Endorois community,
within the framework of a communal property system, and establish the
mechanisms necessary to give domestic legal effect to such right
248
recognised in the Charter and international law.”
Thus, for the
Commission, mere access to Lake Bogoria was insufficient because
“only de jure ownership can guarantee indigenous peoples’ effective
249
protection.”
“The African Commission notes that if international law were to
grant access only, indigenous peoples would remain vulnerable to
further violations/dispossession by the State or third parties. Ownership
ensures that indigenous peoples can engage with the state and third
250
parties as active stakeholders rather than as passive beneficiaries.”
This means that in order for the indigenous group to exercise their right
to “use and enjoyment,” the respondent state must grant them title to
their territory. Those rules are of practical interest in matters of land
grabbing, and provide indigenous peoples a clear base upon which they
can claim their right to property and contest the impact of large scale
land acquisitions taking place without prior consent.
The right to property is, however, not an absolute one. It is thus
possible for the government to justify the eviction of a community
based upon public interest purposes on the condition that it is also in
252
accordance with the law.251 Both requirements are cumulative.
Regarding the justification for public interest, the African Commission
took the view that a much higher threshold needs to be used in case of
encroachment of indigenous land compared to individual private
property.253 It therefore found inspiration in a statement of the UN
Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission for the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which remarked that:
[l]imitations, if any, on the right to indigenous peoples to their
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See id. ¶ 187.
Id. ¶¶ 186–90.
Id. ¶ 196.
Id. ¶ 205.
Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 204.
Id. ¶ 211.
Id.
Id. ¶ 212.

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

2013]

Land Grab in Africa

529

natural resources must flow from the most urgent and compelling
interest of the state. Few, if any, limitations on indigenous resource
rights are appropriate, because the indigenous ownership of the
resources is associated with the most important and fundamental
human rights, including the right to life, food, the right to self254
determination, to shelter, and the right to exist as a people.

Because land is essential to the survival of indigenous peoples,
another threshold must be applied. Having defended this view, the
Commission comes to the “view that the upheaval and displacement of
the Endorois from the land they call home and the denial of their
property rights over their ancestral land is disproportionate to any public
255
need served by the Game Reserve.”
Regarding the second
justification, the Commission argued that law refers to national and
international law.256 After analyzing Kenyan applicable law, it also
referred to the requirements of consultation and compensation found in
the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.257 In
the Saramaka case, the Inter-American Court developed three
safeguards regarding consultation and compensation.258 The state must:
first, ensure the effective participation of the members of the
[indigenous] people, in conformity with their customs and
traditions, regarding any development, investment, exploration or
extraction plan within [the territory of the indigenous people];
second, guarantee that the [indigenous people] will receive a
reasonable benefit from any such plan within their territory; [and]
third, ensure that no concession will be issued within the
[indigenous peoples’] territory unless and until independent and
technically capable entities, with the State’s supervision, perform a
259
prior environmental and social impact assessment.

“In terms of consultation, the threshold is especially stringent in
favor of indigenous peoples, as it also requires that consent be accorded.
Failure to observe the obligations to consult and to seek consent - or to
260
compensate - ultimately results in a violation of the right to property.”
Again, according to the Commission, these safeguards are intended to
preserve, protect and guarantee the special relationship that the
members of the indigenous people have with their territory, which in
254. Erica-Irène A. Daes, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Land and Natural Resources, in
MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PATRICK
THORNBERRY 89 (Nazila Ghanea-Hercock & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005) (emphasis added).
255. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 214.
256. Id. ¶ 219.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. ¶ 227. The criteria were originally developed by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment, supra note 163.
260. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra note 5, ¶ 226 (emphasis omitted).
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turn ensures their survival as a tribal people. The Commission came
to the conclusion that no effective participation of the Endorois had
been sought and that they had been barred from the benefits of the game
262
reserve. As to the question of compensation, the Commission used
the national and international standards to conclude that no
263
compensation was given.
As the property of the Endorois has
severely been encroached upon and as this encroachment was not
proportional to any public need and was not in accordance with national
and international law, the fact proved to be a violation of the right to
property protected under Article 14 of the ACHPR.264
In addition to the right to property, indigenous people might also
seek to protect their natural resources. The right to natural resources is
expressly protected under Article 21 of the African Charter.265 The
African Commission, after analyzing the case law of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in the Saramaka case, found that the Endorois
have, under the ACHPR, the right to freely dispose of their wealth and
natural resources in consultation with the state, and in cases of violation
by spoliation, restitution, and compensation must be provided.266 As the
Endorois have neither received compensation nor restitution of their
land, the facts indicate a violation of the right to resources recognized in
Article 21 of the ACHPR.267
With the Endorois case the African Commission extended the
application of the African Charter to an indigenous people for the first
time.268 The decision is important because the express recognition of the
Endorois as an indigenous people completes the process initiated a
269
decade ago at the Arusha conference.
With its bold description of
traditional lands and the property rights over land and resources, the
decision also provides practical and precise guidance with regard to the
protection of indigenous rights, and recommends reparative measures
that should be granted to indigenous community whose rights have been
infringed upon.

261. Id. ¶ 227.
262. Id. ¶ 228.
263. Id. ¶¶ 229–37.
264. Id. ¶ 238.
265. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21
I.L.M. 58, art. 21 (June 27, 1981) [hereinafter African Charter].
266. Gabrielle Lynch, Becoming Indigenous in the Pursuit of Justice: the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’, Rights and the Endorois, 111 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 24–45, 39
(2012).
267. Id. at 40.
268. See id. at 26.
269. See Becoming Indigenous in the Pursuit of Justice, supra note 266.
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2. National practice
It has been shown that indigenous peoples are quickly being
recognized by the African human rights machinery as beneficiaries of
human rights and that the African Commission has been willing to
move forward on the engaged path in its application of the ACHPR.270
This growing receptiveness to indigenous peoples’ rights is also
perceivable in African national practice. Timid steps are made by
African countries to adapt the constitutional framework to this new
context.271 Without mentioning indigenous communities’ expressis
verbis, some constitutions, such as the 2010 Kenyan Constitution,
reserve a number of seats in parliament for vulnerable groups or special
272
interest groups. These groups are often indigenous communities. The
2005 Burundian Constitution even expressly mentions that three
members of the National Assembly must be co-opted from the Twa
273
indigenous community.
The South African Constitution in turn
274
explicitly protects indigenous languages. While some African states
have thus recognized indigenous communities, with regard to the right
to traditional lands and resources, the situation still remains far from
satisfactory for indigenous peoples and the progressive stand of the
African Commission has not (yet) been echoed in national practice;
African states have in general not changed their approach to who owns
275
the land and its resources. This is attested by the research finding of
the co-sponsored ILO-African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights project examining constitutional, legislative and administrative
276
provisions concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in Africa.
270. Id. at 37.
271. See CONSTITUTION, art. 97 (2010) (Kenya).
272. Id.
273. La Constitution De la Republique Du Burundi [Constitution of the Republic of Burundi]
2005, art. 164 (stating that “l’Assemblée nationale est composée d’au moins cent députés …
[dont] trois députés issus de l’ethnie Twa cooptés conformément au code electoral”).
274. S. AFR. CONST., sec. 6(2), 1996. (recognizing that “the historically diminished use and
status of the indigenous languages of [the country’s] people” imposes upon “the state [to] take
practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages”).
275. See Int. Labor Org. (ILO) and Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR),
Examining Constitutional, Legislative and Administrative Provisions Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in AFRICA, WORKSHOP REP. (2009), at 12–15.
276. The report of the workshop concludes that indigenous peoples are unable to obtain
recognition of their ownership rights in their traditional territories with the consequence that
states often assert ownership over territories, and may sell those rights to third parties. Even when
indigenous peoples have ownership rights to surface territory, the state generally holds the rights
to subsurface resources. There is often no framework in place to ensure respect for indigenous
peoples’ right to use and control their territories when the state or third parties exploit those
resources. When the state carries out development activities in indigenous peoples’ traditional
territories, or licenses third parties to do so, the community that is disadvantaged often receives
little or no benefit. In more extreme cases, the exploitation of natural resources on indigenous
lands has lead to severe environmental degradation with devastating long-term effects. There is
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An exception is “Law 5-2011 on the promotion and protection of
indigenous populations,” adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of
Congo in December 2010 and promulgated by the President on 25
277
February 2011. The law, which is the first on the continent to really
address indigenous issues comprehensively, aims to respond to the
discrimination and marginalization of indigenous groups generally
known under the term “pygmies” and representing between 1.4-10% of
278
the total population of the Republic. The legislative initiative, having
been taken at the time when the UN (draft) Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples entered its final phase, the latter clearly inspired the
drafters of the law.279 One can therefore speak about the law as
implementing the UNDRIP in the national framework.280 As the
UNDRIP, the Congolese law recognizes a whole list of (human) rights
to be exercised individually or collectively by the indigenous group.281
Reference is made to civil and political rights such as equality and nondiscrimination (Art. 2), the right to be consulted and to participate in the
decision making process when it directly or indirectly affects them (Art.
3), the right of marriage and inheritance in accordance with traditional
practices (Art. 5), access to justice (Art. 10) and the right to recourse to
their own customs for the resolution of conflicts (Art. 11), various
cultural rights (Arts. 13-16), the right to education (Arts. 17-21), the
right to health (Arts. 22-25), labor rights (Arts. 26-30), and the right to a
healthy environment (Art. 43).282 An important section of the law is
devoted to property rights and the rights of ownership over traditional
lands and resources.283According to the law, indigenous peoples have a
right (to be exercised collectively and individually) “to own, possess,
access and use the lands and natural resources they have traditionally
used or occupied for their subsistence, pharmacopeia and work” (Art.
31).284 The state has to facilitate delimitation of these lands on the basis
of indigenous customary rights and must ensure “legal recognition of
the title according to customary rights, even in cases where indigenous
therefore a need to develop effective means to consult with the community in question, so that
they have participation in decision-making that is free, fair and informed. See id.
277. Portant Promotion et Protection des Droits des Populations Autochtones, Loi Février 25,
2011. For an analysis of the law See Rep. of the Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the
Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.5, ¶ 40 (July 11, 2011) (analyzing this
specific Republic of Congo law).
278. The use of the term “pygmy” is, however, prohibited by the law for its pejorative
connotation.
279. The Situation of the Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of the Congo, supra note 277.
280. See id. at 12.
281. Id. at 13.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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peoples do not previously possess any kind of formal title (Art. 32).”285
Indigenous peoples can only be removed from their lands for public
purposes (Art. 33) and when expropriated, they must benefit from the
advantages provided by law (Art. 34). Exploitation, expropriation, and
conservation of natural resources and land are only possible after a
sociological and environmental impact assessment study (Art. 35).286
Indigenous peoples have a right to decide on strategies and priorities for
valorizing the lands and natural resources (Art. 36) and must be
consulted when projects affect their lands, resources or way of life
(Arts. 38-39).287
Though they have not adopted specific legislation to recognize
rights over traditional land and resources for indigenous peoples, in
some countries, the existing legal framework has been interpreted in
such a way as to achieve results similar to that intended by the
Congolese law. In 2003, a case was brought to the South African
Constitutional Court by the Richtersveld indigenous community on the
basis of the Restitution Land Claim Act with the objective of being
granted an order for restoring their land from which they had been
dispossessed in order to operate mining activities.288 The court
recognized that indigenous ownership of land occupied prior to
colonization survives change in regime as long as it is not clearly
extinguished by law or act of Crown, state or court.289 To evidence
indigenous ownership, the court agreed to look at customary law which
290
existed prior to colonization. Beyond the recognition of indigenous
land ownership, the case also constitutes an example of emerging state
practice aimed at redressing indigenous peoples for the lands they have
been deprived of.291 Similarly, in 2006, the eviction of the San
community from their land in Botswana led to an investigation into their
right over the territories they traditionally occupied.292 On the basis of
285. Portant Promotion et Protection des Droits des Populations Autochtones, Loi Février 25,
2011. For an analysis of the law See Rep. of the Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the
Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.5, ¶ 13 (July 11, 2011) (analyzing this
specific Republic of Congo law).
286. Act No. 5-2011 On the Promotion and Protection of Indigenous Populations (2011)
(Republic
of
Congo),
available
at
http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_news_files/0368_Congolese_Legislation_on_Indigenous_Peop
les.pdf.
287. Id.
288. Mark Everingham & Crystal Jannecke, Land Restitution and Democratic Citizenship in
South Africa, 32 J. S. AF. STUDIES 543, 547–48 (Sept. 2006).
289. Alexkor Limited v. Richtersveld Community 2003 (5) SA 460 (CC) (S. Afr.)
[hereinafter Alexkor v. Richtersveld].
290. Id. at 24.
291. Everingham & Jannecke, supra note 288, at 543.
292. Botswana Sued Over San People's Water Access, AFROL NEWS, available at
http://www.afrol.com/articles/36237 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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the common law doctrine of aboriginal title, the High Court of
Botswana recognized the existence of land rights to San huntergatherers while declaring that the removal of the community living in
293
the Central Kalahari Game Reserve was unlawful.
Practice at the regional African level shows that although the
situation concerning traditional lands and resources of indigenous
peoples is still problematic, concern over their rights is growing both at
the regional level as well as at the state level, and initiatives have been
taken to bring the existing legal framework further in conformity with
the spirit and content of international instruments such as the ILO
Convention 169 or even the UNDRIP.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The current contribution has shown that there is a consensus at the
international level to consider indigenous peoples as beneficiaries of
human rights to be exercised individually or collectively. Even though it
has proved impossible to agree on a definition of indigenous peoples,
the practice of human rights bodies has shown that a workable
alternative could be found by identifying criteria defining indigenous
peoples.294 The criteria used at the universal level are traditional lands,
historical continuity, distinct cultural characteristics, non-dominance,
and self-identification and group consciousness.295 In Africa, “historical
continuity” as a criteria has been criticized for being irrelevant to the
continent and the emphasis is put on marginalization.296 The result is
that many traditional communities in Africa fulfill the requirement to be
called indigenous peoples.297
Indigenous peoples possess a whole set of rights from which the
right to land and resources is granted a cardinal position in the
international legal instruments on indigenous peoples because
traditional land and resources are essential to what they are; and without
a right of access to their land and resources, indigenous peoples’ rights
would often be meaningless.298 The right to traditional land and
resources include the right of ownership over traditional land and
resources, a right to be consulted and to receive prior consent when
decisions affecting their land and resources are taken.299 Expropriation
293. See Roy Sesana and Keiwa Setlohobogwa v. Attorney General (High Ct. 2006)
(Botswana) Misca. No 52 of 2002.
294. LEENA HEINAMAKI, THE RIGHT TO BE A PART OF NATURE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 2–3 (Lapland University Press 2010).
295. Id. at 3–4.
296. Id. at 3–4, 38.
297. Id. at 2–3.
298. Id. at 4.
299. The Forgotten Peoples?, supra note 157.
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is nevertheless possible for public purposes in which case-effective
compensation must be provided.
With regard to the phenomenon of land grab in Africa, it has been
shown that in these land deals between state governments and foreign
actors, the indigenous peoples who leave from the lands are often
forgotten. They are seldom consulted, do not have a say in the final
decision and do not participate in the profits that the deals generate.300
The indigenous peoples’ rights to traditional lands and resources as they
have been interpreted by the human rights implementation bodies on the
continent, however, make many of the large scale land acquisitions
questionable in terms of law. If the land in question is traditionally
owned—as a good amount of the land in Africa is—indigenous and
traditional communities living on the land have property rights over the
land. Therefore, states cannot sell these lands without proper
consultation and consent. As a result, these lands must be returned to
the traditional communities, or alternatively, the communities must be
fully and effectively compensated.

300. Id.

